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According to cultural evolutionary theory in the tradition of Boyd and Richerson, cultural evolution is
driven by individuals’ learning biases, natural selection, and random forces. Learning biases lead people
to preferentially acquire cultural variants with certain contents or in certain contexts. Natural selection
favors individuals or groups with ﬁtness-promoting variants. Durham (1991) argued that Boyd and
Richerson’s approach is based on a “radical individualism” that fails to recognize that cultural variants
are often “imposed” on people regardless of their individual decisions. Fracchia and Lewontin (2005)
raised a similar challenge, suggesting that the success of a variant is often determined by the degree of
power backing it. With power, a ruler can impose beliefs or practices on a whole population by diktat,
rendering all of the forces represented in cultural evolutionary models irrelevant. It is argued here, based
on work by Boehm (1999, 2012), that, from at least the time of the early Middle Paleolithic, human
bands were controlled by powerful coalitions of the majority that deliberately guided the development
of moral norms to promote the common good. Cultural evolutionary models of the evolution of morality
have been based on false premises. However, Durham (1991) and Fracchia and Lewontin’s (2005) chal-
lenge does not undermine cultural evolutionary modeling in nonmoral domains.The Quarterly Review of Biology, December 2018, Vol. 93, No. 4
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A CCORDING to mainstream culturalevolutionary theory, individuals pos-
sess “cultural variants”—“idea[s], skill[s], be-
lief[s], attitude[s], and value[s]” (Richerson
and Boyd 2005:63) mostly “stored in hu-
man brains” (Richerson and Boyd 2005:61).
Through interactingwith eachother, people
may adopt and transmit these variants. Cul-
tural evolutionists seek to identify thedisposi-
tions that underlie the transmission process,
and explain why those dispositions were fa-
vored by natural selection under ancestral
conditions (Henrich and McElreath 2003;
Lewens2015:17).Having(purportedly)iden-
tiﬁed how people acquire and transmit cul-
ture, mathematical modelers can, given the
ﬁtness values of cultural variants and their
distribution in a population, predict the fu-
ture evolution of a culture, or explain retro-
actively why some variants proliferated and
others disappeared.
Fracchia andLewontin (2005:21–22) raise
a fundamental objection to this researchpro-
gram. They note that the success or failure of
a cultural variant can depend “crucially on
the amount of power behind it” (Fracchia
and Lewontin 2005:22). Cultural evolution-
ary models assume that people more readily
acquire beliefs and values with certain intrin-
sic properties, or preferentially learn from
certain kinds of people in certain contexts.
The models do not seem to account for the
possibility that cultural variants can be im-
posed on people coercively, regardless of
their“learningrules”or“transmissionbiases”
(Richerson andBoyd2005). Indeed, in a “list
of cultural evolutionary forces discussed” in
Not by Genes Alone, Richerson and Boyd (2005:
Table 3.1) say nothing about power or co-
ercion. All of the forces mentioned involve
voluntary imitation (see alsoHenrichandMc-
Elreath 2003:Box 3). This potentially leaves
out a big factor that operates in real life.
Whether “punishment,” which Richerson and
Boyd do not include on their list of cultural
evolutionary forces but which they do discuss
in other parts of the book and in other works,
or “prestige bias” captures the phenomenon
of power as it is exercised in real life will be
discussed presently.This content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press TermSome years before Fracchia and Lewontin
(2005), Durham (1991) criticized Boyd and
Richerson for what he described as their
“radical individualism” that ignores “struc-
tured asymmetries or power relations, and
coercion” (Durham 1991:182). When Boyd
and Richerson do mention power or coer-
cion at all (e.g., Boyd and Richerson 1985:
229–230), they treat it as “individually deliv-
ered ‘punishment of noncooperators’” (Dur-
ham 1991:182).
Mainstreamcultural evolutionistshavenot
changed their approach in response to Dur-
hamor Fracchia and Lewontin. To illustrate,
consider a classic empirical study in the Boyd
and Richerson tradition in which Gürerk
et al. sought to investigate “institutional se-
lection” (Gürerk et al. 2006:108). In their
experiment, anonymous subjects played a 30-
round public goods game, with each round
consistingof three stages: an “institutionchoice,”
a “voluntary contribution,” and a “sanction-
ing” stage. In the ﬁrst stage, subjects “simul-
taneously and independently” chose to adopt
either a “sanctioning institution” (SI) or a
“sanction-free institution” (SFI; Gürerk et al.
2006:108). In the secondstage, subjects (anon-
ymously) played a public goods game with all
of the others who had chosen the same insti-
tution, and they were informed about how
much each of the other players in both groups
had contributed to the public good (thus
the SI group members knew how well they
were doing compared with SFI group mem-
bers and vice versa). In the third stage, sub-
jects in the SI group were allowed to pay to
punish or reward each other.
In the ﬁrst couple rounds, most subjects
chose the SFI. However, freeriding in the SFI
group led contributions to fall precipitously.
Punishment in the SI group quickly led con-
tributions to rise to the near-maximum level.
The vastmajority of subjects who initially chose
the SFI ended up switching to the SI and
adopting aprosocial strategy.Thosewhopar-
ticipated in the SI received a signiﬁcantly
higher payoff than those who stuck with the
SFI. Henrich describes this study as an “ex-
perimental demonstration of cultural group
selection in action.” A key lesson, he says, is
that “the players’ degree of rationality did2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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and select the higher payoff institution on
the ﬁrst interaction” (Henrich 2006:61).
Canwe really draw conclusions about “cul-
tural group selection” from Gürerk et al.’s
(2006) experiment? Or were there “power
relations” and “coercion” that were decisive
in the real-life cultural evolution of cooper-
ation and punishment but which were not
captured in the experimental setup? It is true
that subjects in the SI group were able to
“punish” each other, and in that sense they
wielded a kind of power. But there are some
essential differences between power, pun-
ishment, and coercion in real life and that
among Gürerk et al.’s (2006) subjects in the
SI group. First, subjects were able to choose
beforehand whether they wished to be sub-
ject to punishment or not (i.e., they chose
whether to participate in the SI or the SFI).
Henrich (2006) imagines that this is analo-
gous to hunter-gatherers in the ancestral en-
vironment choosing which band to migrate
to. However, the option to avoid being sub-
jected to punishment by preemptively mi-
grating was probably only an option for our
hunter-gatherer ancestors in very limited cir-
cumstances(becausemigrationopportunities
are limited, hunter-gatherers often receive
the threat of expulsion as a death threat. See
the section below titled The Reverse Domi-
nance Hierarchy and Deliberate Guidance of
Cultural Evolution for a real-life illustration.
When hunter-gatherers do have the chance
to migrate, it is typically to culturally similar
bands). Second, power in the experiment was
symmetrical not, as it typically is in real life,
asymmetrical (see Singh et al. 2017:461–
462)—in the experiment anyone could pun-
ish anyone for any reason (that is to say, in
real life, those with less power cannot punish
individuals—or groups—with more power.
And a noncooperative individual who vio-
lates group rules cannot go around punish-
ing cooperative groupmembers). Third, and
perhaps most important, the experimental
setup totally eliminated the possibility of col-
lectivedecision-making.Again,anonymous sub-
jects “simultaneously and independently” chose
whether to participate in the SI or the SFI.
Henrich points out that most subjects failedThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termto “foresee” that higher payoffs would ulti-
mately be reaped by participants in the SI.
He argues that this shows that successful in-
stitutions are not generally designed with ra-
tional foresight—people just cannot predict
the consequences of different institutional ar-
rangements. But if instead of simultaneously
and independently choosing their “institu-
tion” subjects had been allowed to meet
and coordinate a strategy, it is quite likely
that most everyone would have been able
to “foresee” that the best strategy would be
to adopt the SI and to collectively punish free-
loaders. The experimental setup artiﬁcially
prevented this from happening because it
was predicated on radical individualism that
sees cultural evolution as driven by the deci-
sions of uncoordinated, independently act-
ing individuals.
The results of one ofOstromet al.’s (1992:
412–413) experiments seem to support the
assumption that, if people are allowed to
communicate andmake a collective decision,
they can anticipate the beneﬁts of punish-
ment. Groups of eight subjects played a com-
monpool resourcegame for20 rounds.After
the 10th round, subjects met face-to-face for
10 minutes and were allowed to decide (by a
majority vote) whether to institute a “sanc-
tioning mechanism” with a fee-to-ﬁne ratio of
1/2 for their future interactions. Out of four
groups in this experimental condition, two
instituted a sanctioning mechanism (with
fee-to-ﬁne ratios of 10¢/20¢ and 20¢/40¢,
respectively). However, Ostrom et al. (1992)
note that the subjects in this experiment had
previously participated in another experi-
ment where they played a common pool re-
source game with a sanctioning mechanism but
no chance for communication. Out of the 14
subjects who voted against the sanctioning
mechanism, 11 had previously participated
in a design with a relatively high fee-to-ﬁne
ratio of 20¢/80¢. Out of the 18 who voted in
favor of the mechanism, just three had been
in the 20¢/80¢ design. They “infer from this
result that the high level of sanctioning ac-
tivity in the 20¢/80¢ design, the lack of over-
all efﬁciency gains and the presence of blind
revenge combined to impede the willingness
of participants to choose a sanctioningmech-2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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gest that “the experience of the ﬁrst 10 rounds
of the . . . game had an effect on mechanism
choice” (Ostrom et al. 1992:413). To test this
possibility, they conducted two more experi-
ments where subjects could communicate
and adopt a sanctioning mechanism before
playing any rounds. The result: “In both of
these experiments, the subjects quickly agreed
to an investment strategy and a sanctioning
mechanism to punish defectors. Across the
two experiments, net yields averaged 95%–
94% with fees and ﬁnes included” (Ostrom
et al. 1992:413).What Is “Power”?
In order to properly articulate Durham
andFracchiaandLewontin’s (DFL)challenge,
we should have a clear idea of what power
is. Fracchia and Lewontin (2005; Lewontin
2005) refer simply to “power,” which they il-
lustrate with examples of rulers imposing
cultural variants by decree. They do not ex-
plicitly describe the mechanisms that make
suchdecreeseffective.Durhamusually refers
just to “power,” and at one point to “struc-
tured asymmetries or power relations, and
coercion” (Durham 1991:182)—phraseology
that seems to imply that “power relations” and
“coercion” are different things. “Power” is
clearly a multifarious concept. Which type(s)
of power might pose a challenge to tradi-
tional cultural evolutionary modeling?
Inhis inﬂuential analysis,Dahl (1957) sug-
gests that the “intuitive idea of power . . . is
something like” the following: “A has power
over B to the extent that he can get B to
do something that B would not otherwise
do” (Dahl 1957:202–203; cf. Lukes 2005:30).
Whether or not this deﬁnition describes our
intuitive idea of power, it is clearly too broad
for the present purposes. On Dahl’s deﬁni-
tion, virtually all cultural transmission would
have to be conceived as a manifestation of
power. Any timeB copiesA,A exercises power
overB, even if B is guidedbyoneof the learn-
ing biases represented in standard cultural
evolutionary models.
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) offer a useful
taxonomy of power (see discussion in Lukes
2005:21–22), which may allow us to pick outThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termthose forms that present a challenge for cul-
tural evolutionary modeling. Their taxon-
omy includes inﬂuence, authority, force, and
manipulation. A inﬂuences B when A, “with-
out resorting to either a tacit or an overt
threat of severe deprivations, causes [B] . . .
to change his course of action” (Bachrach
and Baratz 1970:30). A exercises authority
when B “complies because he recognizes that
the command is reasonable in terms of his
own values” (Bachrach and Baratz 1970:34).
A uses force when A obtains compliance by
depriving B of choice. Amanipulates B when
B’s “compliance is forthcoming in the ab-
sence of recognition on the complier’s part
either of the source or the exact nature of the
demand upon him” (Bachrach and Baratz
1970:28).
According toBachrachandBaratz’s (1970)
jargon, “power” should refer only to cases
where B complies with A because B fears
that A “will deprive him of a value or val-
ues which he regardsmore highly than those
which would have been achieved by non-
compliance” (Bachrach and Baratz 1970:24).
“Force,” they say, should refer only to cases
of physical manipulation. However, follow-
ing Lukes (2005)—and common usage—we
can regard inﬂuence, authority, force, and
manipulation as species of power. When A
deprives B of the option of following a course
of action, this is an exercise of force.
Inﬂuence, as Bachrach and Baratz deﬁne
it, is a form of power that can, in general, be
easily accommodated by cultural evolution-
ary models. When people freely copy each
other, this is a way of being inﬂuenced. Stan-
dard cultural evolutionary models simply
reﬂect the rules, or the learning biases, that de-
termine how people freely copy each other.
Force is the form of power that poses the
mostobvious(apparent)challengetothemod-
els. If cultural variants are imposed on peo-
ple because the option to reject them is taken
away by force, then it seems that standard
cultural evolutionary models cannot explain
what happened.
Authority is established when individuals
freely recognize the right of a leader tomake
certain demands on them. If cultural variants
spread on a large scale because of the exer-
cise of authority, this would seem to under-2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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to some extent. If people accept the authority
of a leader to tell them what cultural variants
to adopt, to the extent that the leader exer-
cises their authority, the learning biases of
cultural evolutionary models will cease to
play a decisive role in (further) cultural evo-
lution. Learning biases might explain why
people choose to accept the authority of a
particular leader in the ﬁrst place, but they
would not determine which variants subse-
quently spread. When religious leaders pro-
mulgate opinions about values or doctrine,
their followers may adopt those opinions be-
cause they accept the authority of the leader.
To reiterate, cultural evolutionary models
might help explain how authority itself comes
to be established (e.g., how people become
Catholic and thereby accept the Pope’s au-
thority). But, just as when cultural variants
are spread through force, when they are
spread through the exercise of authority the
learning biases of cultural evolutionarymod-
els play no role. When Durham (1991) dis-
tinguished between “power relations” and
“coercion,” perhaps he had in mind the dis-
tinction between “authority” and “force.”
Authority and force can interact in inter-
esting ways. For example, one reason that we
accept authority might be that it is backed
by force (would PrimeMinister Theresa May
retain her authority if the military and the
police disbanded? Probably not for long).
Conversely, the power to employ force is of-
ten made possible by widespread acceptance
of the legitimacy of the authority (people tol-
erate Theresa May giving orders to the mili-
tary and the police because they accept her
right to be Prime Minister). Sorting out how
this works in detail is not important for the
present discussion. The point is that when
cultural variants are spread through the ex-
ercise of either force or authority, the learn-
ing biases featuring in cultural evolutionary
models are to that extent irrelevant.
Manipulation—surreptitiously generating
desires in people to make certain choices—
generally works by taking advantage of learn-
ing biases. For example, advertisers use ce-
lebrity endorsements to take advantage of
prestige bias. The SaraLeeCorporationpaid
former basketball star Michael Jordan a greatThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termdeal of money to endorse Hanes underwear
because many people are motivated to copy
successful athletes. Richerson and Boyd (2005:
124) note that somemen also started shaving
their heads because this wasMichael Jordan’s
practice. They cite imitating Jordan’s choice
of underwear and imitating his hairstyle as
illustrations of “prestige bias.” But these two
cases of imitation illustrate different kinds of
power. When men shave their heads because
of Jordan, they are being inﬂuenced. When
they buy Hanes because of him, they are
(most likely) being manipulated.
In principle, cultural evolution driven by
manipulation can be modeled in the same
way as that driven by inﬂuence. Of course, if
manipulation is a decisive factor, an explana-
tion of cultural evolution that leaves this fact
out and appeals only to the learning biases of
the people who were manipulated would be
impoverished. But there is no reason why
standard cultural evolutionary models can-
not be used to track how cultural variants
spread in such circumstances. Prestige, how-
ever, has a superﬁcial resemblance to author-
ity. The following section considers whether
the latter can be reduced to the former.
The fact that which cultural variants peo-
pleadoptmaybedeterminedby theirposition
in networks of power—speciﬁcally networks
of force and authority—cannot be captured,
at least in any obvious way, by models that
are predicated on a strong form ofmethodo-
logical individualism. Models that are com-
mitted to a highly individualistic picture of
decision-making and action will also miss the
fact that, when it comes to force and author-
ity, the locus of power is very often a group of
collectively acting individuals.Can Power Be Reduced to
“Coordinated Punishment”
or “Prestige Bias”?
Coordinated punishment and prestige bias
are two phenomena that already feature in
mainstream cultural evolutionary models.
If either one captures the phenomenon of
power—namely, the exercise of force or au-
thority—in a sufﬁciently realistic way, then
cultural evolutionary modeling would not be
threatened by DFL’s challenge. This section2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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tige bias in turn.
Boyd et al. acknowledge that previousmod-
els of the evolution of punishment have been
unrealistic in their assumption that “punish-
ment is an unconditional and uncoordinated
individual action automatically triggered by
defection” (Boyd et al. 2010:617). To rectify
this shortcoming, they propose a model (also
defended in Bowles and Gintis 2011:Chap-
ter 9) of what they call “coordinated punish-
ment of defectors.” This sounds like it may
be a step toward incorporating collective so-
cial phenomena (including collectively exer-
cised force) into cultural evolutionary models.
However, closer inspection suggests that the
kind of coordination captured by Boyd et al.’s
(2010) model is still unrealistically individu-
alistic. In their model, “coordinated punish-
ment” means that, when individuals decide
whether to punish defectors, they take into
account whether other individuals have sig-
naled their intention to punish defectors. But,
as shall be argued, the decision to punish—as
it is represented in this model—is made
without the sort of collective plan that sup-
ports cooperative behavior in real life, and
that, according to anthropological evidence,
played an essential role in the evolution of
prosocial norms.
Boyd et al. say that, in their model, “pun-
ishment is coordinated among group mem-
bers so that it is contingent on the number of
others predisposed to participate in the pun-
ishment” (Boyd et al. 2010:617). But there is
much more to the coordinated punishment
describedby anthropologists, or evenbyBoyd
et al. in their verbal description of anthro-
pological observations. As Boyd et al. them-
selves say:
ethnographicevidence indicates thatpunish-
ment is coordinated by means of gossip and
other communication among punishers, is
contingent on the expected effectiveness of
punishment in inducing cooperation, and it
is not undertaken unless it is judged as legit-
imate by most group members (Boyd et al.
2010:617).
The collective agreement and action that
emerges from this kind of cooperation can-This content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termnot be reduced to punishing in response to
signs that others will punish.
In Boyd et al.’s (2010) model, individuals
are drawn from a population of “punishers”
and “nonpunishers” to form groups. Mem-
bers of each group engage in an initial three-
stage interaction. In theﬁrst stage, punishers
exhibit a “signal.” In the second stage, if a
threshold number of other individuals in the
group gave the signal, punishers cooperate
(with probability 1 – e)—otherwise they de-
fect. Nonpunishers always defect at this stage.
In the third stage, if the threshold number
of punishers revealed themselves in the ﬁrst
stage, the punishers impose a cost on those
whodid not cooperate.Groupmembers then
engage in further interactions consisting only
of cooperation/defection and punishment
stages.
In administering apunishment, eachpun-
isher incurs a cost.Themorepunishers there
are in a group, the less the total cost of in-
ﬂicting punishment on a defector, since the
defector’s ability to retaliate at all can be as-
sumed todiminishexponentiallywith increas-
ing numbers of punishers.
Becausepunishment imposes a cost onde-
fectors that is, on average, greater than the
cost of cooperating, in general, cooperation
maximizes expected payoff if defectors face
punishment. In the model, defectors who
are punished in the ﬁrst round subsequently
behave likepunishers, cooperatingwithprob-
ability 1 – e. They defect with probability e
either because of error or because, due to
random differences in circumstances, coop-
erationmay be costlier than being punished.
In the model, after engaging in a (ran-
domly varying) number of interactions, in-
dividuals produce offspring according to the
payoff they received, and new groups are
formed fromamix of theoffspring.Offspring
inherit the strategy of “punishing” or “non-
punishing” from their parent.
Boyd et al.’s basic conclusion is that “the
initial proliferation of punishment occurs
underplausible levelsofgroupgeneticdiffer-
ences and results in persistent and high levels
of cooperation” (Boyd et al. 2010:620). Pun-
ishers are able to proliferate in their model
because—unlike in other models—they re-
frain from inﬂicting costly punishment un-2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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group to reduce the cost, and they are able
to do this because punishers “coordinate” by
signaling their intentions. This paper will
argue that prosocial-norm-enforcingpunish-
ment did not evolve in this way, with individ-
ual contingent, signaling punishers gradually
inﬁltrating groups of nonpunishers in the
ancestral environment. Rather, individuals
within groups of nonpunishers formedcoali-
tions to collectively impose prosocial norms
on all group members. And, through a pro-
cess of gene-culture coevolution, we became
genetically adapted to be receptive to such
norms, including norms to punish noncoop-
erators. The evidence will show that Boyd
et al.’s (2010) model gives an incorrect his-
torical account of how punishment arose in
human evolution, and of how we evolved a
disposition to punish norm violators.
The discussion above suggests that power
cannot be reduced to coordinated punish-
ment. Can it be reduced to “prestige bias”?
Prestige bias refers to our (well-established)
tendency to preferentially copy individuals
who are successful, or to whom others are pay-
ing attention or deferring (see, e.g., Chudek
et al. 2012). This is, of course, one of the cen-
tral learning biases taken into account by cul-
tural evolutionary models.
It is true that prestigious and prominent
peoplehave(ceterisparibus)moreinﬂuence
overculture thanthe lessprestigious,and this
inﬂuence is a form of “power.”When celeb-
rity Kylie Jenner tweeted that she did not use
the app Snapchat anymore, the company’s
stock lost 1.3 billion dollars in value. That is
because when Jenner says she uses or does
not use something, many people will be in-
clined to imitate her.
But the “power” of Kylie Jenner is funda-
mentally different from the power of a king,
a hunter-gatherer coalition enforcing rules,
or even the Pope. Jenner’s inﬂuence derives
from the fact thatmany people preferentially
imitate her. When she exhibits behavior, or
expresses an opinion, we can explain why it
spreads by appealing to the learning biases
(namely, the prestige bias) of her audience.
The kindof power that threatens cultural evo-
lutionarymodeling is that which is backed by
force or authority, and which thereby neutral-This content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termizes all of the learning biases featuring in
mathematical models. Neither force nor au-
thority can be reduced to prestige bias, since
force and authority neutralize all learning
biases. When, in 1492, Isabella I and Ferdi-
nand II issued theAlhambraDecreeordering
the Jews of Spain to convert to Catholicism,
leave, or be executed (as discussed in more
detail below), it is theoretically possible that
a small number of Jews were impressed by
the religious passion of the prestigious queen
and king and converted for that reason. But
most of the Jews who converted probably
did so because their freedom to choose had
been coercively restricted. Living in Spain
as a practicing Jew was literally no longer a
possible choice. In hunter-gatherer groups, in-
dividuals did not have the choice to refrain
from sharing meat or contributing to group
defense—if they did not do these things, and
were recalcitrant enough in the face of re-
proach, they would be subject to execution
or (what was often effectively the same thing)
expulsion.Approaches to Accommodating Power
Lewontin (2005) illustrates the role of
power in cultural evolution with an exam-
ple. Bavarians are mostly Catholic, Westpha-
lians Protestant. This state of affairs was not
brought about (according to Lewontin) by
any mechanism recognized by cultural evo-
lutionists—not by biased transmission, the
relative appeal of the content of the two reli-
gions, drift, Darwinian selection, or any other
(see the list in Richerson and Boyd 2005:
Table 3.1). Rather, Lewontin says, in 1555 the
German princes and the Holy Roman Em-
peror adopted “the rule of cuius regio, eius re-
ligio, which allowed rulers to enforce their
own religion in their own dominions and to
expel those who were recalcitrant” (Lewon-
tin 2005). If cultural change is usually driven
in this way—by sweeping diktats issued by
powerful individuals or small groups—then
Boyd and Richerson-type modeling, which
tracks “the aggregated effects of small-scale
events” (Lewens 2015:17), will have a very lim-
ited range of application. Most of history—
and thePaleolithic culture towhichourminds
are adapted—would better be explained by2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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impose their favored cultural variants on
themasses, and cultural evolutionarymodels
would not shed much light on the selective
forces that shaped our social learning dispo-
sitions.
As Lewens notes, it would surely be a huge
overestimation of the power of the typical
ruler to suppose that they can change the
religious beliefs of a population by mere de-
cree. In regard to the speciﬁc example of
cuius regio, eius religio, it is not clear that the
German princes even tried to change peo-
ple’s religious beliefs on a large scale. They
tended to “enforce” Catholicism or Luther-
anism on their subjects according to what
was already the prevailing religion, and even
subjects in the minority did not necessarily
convert in response to the ofﬁcial order (Le-
wens 2015:133).
But that is just one example. It seems clear
that sometimes cultural variants, even reli-
gious beliefs, can spread as a result of being
backed by power. As discussed, the forms of
power that seem to undermine cultural evo-
lutionary modeling are force and authority.
Sometimespowermakes all of thedifference
in which cultural variants prevail in a group.
The AlhambraDecree, which expelled prac-
ticing Jews from Spain in 1492, caused more
than two-thirds of the not already-converted
Jewish population to become Catholic, at
least nominally. The decree, initiated by one
person (Isabella I) and signed by two (the
aforementioned and Ferdinand II) radically
changed the distribution (and attractiveness)
of certain cultural variants in Spain, and its
consequences reverberated for centuries.
In the 4th century, Christianity surely got a
boost from being supported by Constantine,
although whether this was responsible for its
ultimate triumph is difﬁcult to say.
Lewens (2015:138–139) proposes three
ways in which cultural evolutionary research
programs could accommodate the phenom-
enon of power. First, restriction: we could
simply restrict the application of models to
times and places where cultural evolution is
not driven by Lewontin scenarios—“where
human societies have been free of interest
groups, governments, unions, and perhaps
gross asymmetries of individual power” (Le-
wens 2015:138). Second, presumption: weThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termcould take systems of power as “ﬁxed back-
ground conditions against which individuals
interact” (Lewens 2015:138), using cultural
evolutionary theory to track cultural change
resulting from those interactions. And, ﬁ-
nally, reduction: we could try to reduce sys-
tems of power—“governmental structures,
judicial procedures, and so forth” (Lewens
2015:139)—to small-scale interactions dealt
with by standard cultural evolutionary theory.
By restricting cultural evolutionary mod-
eling to times and places “free of interest
groups, governments, unions, and . . . gross
asymmetries of individual power” (Lewens
2015:138), restriction undermines any mod-
eling applied to modern societies. Lewens
suggests that we could still use cultural evo-
lutionary models to investigate early hominin
history, since “hunter-gatherers were largely
egalitarian with respect to individuals’ access
to economic resources” (Lewens 2015:138,
citing Boehm 1999 and Knauft 1991). But
even this is not certain. Despite their lack of
formal leaders, great differences in individ-
ual power among adult males, or great dif-
ferences in individual access to economic
resources, hunter-gatherers do have systems
of rules, coercion, and punishment. In fact,
as shall be argued below, the egalitarianism
of hunter-gatherers is itself maintained by
the exercise of power wielded by the rank
and ﬁle over their potential dominators (or
alphas), creating what Boehm (1993, 1997,
1999) calls a “reverse dominance hierarchy.”
This means that even hunter-gatherers pos-
sess a power apparatus that could theoreti-
cally be used to impose cultural variants on
individuals willy-nilly and force deviants into
line. Whether hunter-gatherers actually do
use this power to inﬂuence the spread of cul-
tural variants in a way that undermines Boyd
and Richerson-type modeling is the central
question addressed in the present paper.
The problem with presumption—taking
power relations as “ﬁxed background condi-
tions against which individuals interact” (Le-
wens 2015:138)—is that it seems to ignore
DFL’s challenge. Supposewewant to explain
the spread of different sects of Christianity in
mid-16th-century Germany. An explanation
emphasizing the forces listed in Richerson
and Boyd (2005:Table 3.1) and relegating
power relations to “ﬁxed background condi-2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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misleading, in that it would be taking for
granted the factor that ought to be a primary
target of a scientiﬁc explanation (even if, as
Lewens argues, it was not the whole story).
How could we construct an explanation of
the spread of Catholicism and Lutheranism
taking the power of the princes as “ﬁxed
background conditions”? Perhaps we could
treat the positive and negative incentives
offered for adopting different beliefs in dif-
ferentplaces asbeing features of theenviron-
ment like the weather. The fact that people
prefer, ceteris paribus, denominations that
do not cause them to be exiled from their
home could be considered a “content bias.”
Although it may be possible to model the
decision-making process of German peasants
along these lines, this approachwould ignore
the fact that a major driving force of cultural
evolution is theasymmetricalpower relations
of theprinces and thepeasants. Fracchia and
Lewontin’s (2005) point is that explaining
historical trends—trends about how cultural
variants spread—requires us to recognize
power as a major factor. In Durham’s words,
“to ignore [power] . . . is to ignore what may
often be the leading cause of transforma-
tion” (Durham 1991:182). The fact that we
can treat the inﬂuence of power as a given
and focus on individual decision-making
does nothing to counter the claim that power
often plays a decisive role in the fate of cul-
tural variants. Lewens raises a similar problem
for presumption, saying that as a strategy it
“simply omits to explain many features that
are admitted as important in determining cul-
tural change” (Lewens 2015:138), although
he says presumption can be useful for “un-
derstanding . . . individual interactions and
their long-term effects” (Lewens 2015:138).
This leaves reduction—reducing the inﬂu-
enceof power to individual-level interactions
that can behandledby standard cultural evo-
lutionary models. In Lewens’s view, the jus-
tiﬁcation for this approach is that power
relations are all grounded in individual inter-
actions, which should in principle be ame-
nable to populational modeling. This does
seem to be the approach advocated by cul-
tural evolutionary modelers themselves (e.g.,
Boyd and Richerson 2002; Richerson and
Henrich 2012), although in practice theirThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termmodels do not generally reﬂect power rela-
tions at all.
But redescribing the exercise of power in
terms of individual interactions does not ne-
gate the fact that power is a factor, and it
does not neutralize DFL’s challenge. Con-
sider again the Alhambra Decree. Isabella
and Ferdinand issued an order (Jews had to
convert, leave, or be executed). Since those
with the ability to enforce theorder—the sol-
diers—accepted the authority of themonar-
chy, they conveyed the threat to the Jews, who
chose whether to convert or leave (no one
volunteered for execution). If we want to
explain why Spanish soldiers accepted the
monarchy, we would probably need to refer
to all of the learning biases that ﬁgure in cul-
tural evolutionary models. If we want to ex-
plain how Jews responded to the threat, we
could say that the cost of being overtly com-
mitted to Judaism had increased, and since
people have a content bias to acquire cultural
variants with lower costs, Judaism became less
attractive. So rather than saying that the Jews
converted in response to the exerciseof power
by Isabella and Ferdinand, we can say that
they decided which practices to adopt in
light of the incentives. But we still cannot ex-
plain what happened without referring to
the fact that, because the social structure gave
power to themonarchs, two individuals drove
cultural evolution in a speciﬁc direction. To
explain why the powerful individuals acted
as they did, we would need to engage in tra-
ditional historical, sociological, or psycholog-
ical analysis.Can Cultural Evolutionary
Modeling Be Restricted to the
Ancestral Environment?
Modern societies are founded on exten-
sive, complex systemsof power.The informa-
tion we are able to obtain, the opinions we
are exposed to, and the options that are pre-
sented to us are constrained in all sorts of
ways by the (often hidden) exercise of force
andauthority.DFL’s challengetoculturalevo-
lutionary modeling appears to have great
force when it comes to understanding how
cultural variants spread in extremely hierar-
chical societies where powerful individuals
and groups exercise such far-reaching con-2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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used to explain some aspects of cultural evo-
lution even in modern societies. When peo-
ple’s choices in a particular domain are
largely unconstrained by power, the models
can sometimes explain how and why culture
develops as it does. For example, cultural
evolutionary models can explain the demo-
graphic transition in the West (Richerson
and Boyd 2005:Chapter 5), since people in
Western countries in recenthistoryhavebeen
largely free to choose how many children to
have. Power is rarely the only factor inﬂuenc-
ing what people believe and how they act, so
models might be used in conjunction with
traditionalhistorical/anthropological/socio-
logical methods. But to explain phenomena
such as the spread of communism and the
concomitant values in the 20th century, a
study of the inﬂuence of power will often be
more fruitful than a study of the aggregate ef-
fect of the decisions of many individuals.
Cataloging all of the ways in which power
can or does inﬂuence the spread of cultural
variants, and inwhich itmightunderminecul-
tural evolutionary modeling, is not the aim of
the present paper. This paper has a narrower
focus, which is to consider whether or to what
extent power undermines cultural evolution-
ary modeling applied to nomadic, foraging
societies. It seeks to test the possibility raised
by Lewens (2015) that we can restrict the ap-
plication of Boyd and Richerson-style models
to conditions that prevailed during the long
periodbefore the advent of sedentarism, food
storage, and agriculture, when human soci-
ety was reputedly egalitarian.
There are two reasons why it is worthwhile
to investigate whether Boyd and Richerson-
style models can be applied unproblemati-
cally to nomadic foragers. First, the models
have beenused to give accounts of thehistor-
ical origins of speciﬁc cultural variants, such
as certain ethical norms. If the models can-
not be applied to nomadic foraging societies
(where the variants in question originated),
thenwewillhavetoreconsider theseaccounts.
Second, the models—predicated on the idea
that cultural variants spread in the ancestral
environment due largely to content and con-
text learning biases—have beenused tomake
predictions about what psychological adap-
tations we might have. Given that variantsThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termspread due to content and context learn-
ing biases, cultural evolutionary theorists ask
what psychological dispositions we might
have evolved in order to extract adaptive
information from the cultural environment.
But if power was a major factor inﬂuencing
how variants spread in the ancestral environ-
ment, then we might make different predic-
tions about how our psychology evolved. We
might predict, for example, that we evolved
to have different attitudes toward variants
imposed on us by power and those that we
adopted due to learning biases.
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)havea strong
dominancehierarchybasedonphysical force.
The alpha individual rules because he (some-
times with the help of his coalition partner)
can beat up every other chimp. Beta can beat
up gamma, and so on down the line. Under
naturalconditions,alladultmales,beingphys-
ically stronger, are dominant to all females
(Goodall 1986).
Dominant chimps use their social position
primarily to secure access to food andmating
opportunities. Dominance relations have lit-
tle direct inﬂuence on cultural transmission.
Chimps have different, culturally transmitted
ways of ﬁshing for termites, building nests,
and performing a few other tasks.Which cul-
tural variant an individual acquires depends
on thepractice of themost accessiblemodels
and features of the local environment (Mc-
Grew 2004:Chapter 7). Under experimental
conditions, chimps preferentially attend to
dominant individuals when learning how to
solve foraging problems, and aremore likely
to copy their methods (Horner et al. 2010).
But dominant individuals have no interest
in—andmayevenlackawarenessof—thecul-
tural practices of their subordinates, hence
theymakenoattempt to forcibly spread their
favored practices. The common ancestor of
chimps and humans probably had a similar
hierarchical social structure (Boehm 1999).
At somepoint, hominins developedmuch
greater awareness of cultural possibilities, and
amuchgreater capacity for deliberately trans-
mitting learned practices. It became feasible
for dominant individuals to force subordi-
natestoadopttheirpreferredculturalvariants.
Richerson and Henrich note that “[p]reda-
tory elites and other self-interested subgroups
with some form of coercive power” could2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
s and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
POWER IN CULTURAL EVOLUTIONDecember 2018 307establish norms and institutions that “dis-
proportionately beneﬁt them. Ideologically
motivated groups with coercive power may
sustain equilibria at mad extremes, at least for
brief periods of time” (Richerson and Hen-
rich 2012:50; they do not comment on the
implications this might have for cultural evo-
lutionary modeling). But elites who impose
cultural variants on others do not necessarily
have to bemotivated by narrow self-interest—
they could be prompted by altruism, concern
for the commonweal, or the belief that a well-
functioning group will ultimately beneﬁt
themselves (i.e., enlightened self-interest).
In any case, if dominant individuals or coali-
tions in the Paleolithic did exercise power to
impose cultural variants on others, it could
create a problem for cultural evolutionary
modeling for the reasons discussed above.
There are two crucial empirical questions
to answer. First, was there any locus of power
in Paleolithic communities capable of impos-
ing cultural variants on subordinates? Sec-
ond, if the answer to the ﬁrst question is yes,
was this power routinely exercised in a way
that supportsDFL’s critiqueof cultural evolu-
tionary modeling? These questions are dealt
with in turn in the following two sections.
Based on work by Boehm, the ﬁrst will be an-
swered in the afﬁrmative. The second will
also be answered in the afﬁrmative, but with
a qualiﬁcation. It will be argued that, in the
ancestral environment, power was used pri-
marily as a means of enforcingmoral norms.
Therefore, DFL’s critique undermines stan-
dard cultural evolutionary modeling applied
to moral norms that arose in the past 250,000
years, but it does not necessarily undermine
modeling applied to nonmoral norms in the
ancestral environment. It also does not nec-
essarily undermine modeling applied to the
evolution of moral norms and intuitions that
might have occurred before 250,000 bp (the
speciﬁc example of Baumard et al.’s 2013
model will be discussed).The Existence of Power
in the Paleolithic
Knauft notes that “male status differentia-
tion inhumanevolution isU-shaped” (Knauft
1991:397). The social organization of the
chimp-human common ancestor is presumedThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termto have been as hierarchical as that of mod-
ern chimps. After hunter-gatherers settled
down and developed the means to stockpile
food, human societies became even more hi-
erarchical than those of chimps. For some
millions of years after the chimp-human lin-
eages split and before sedentary, hierarchi-
cal societies were established, humans lived
as nomadic hunter-gatherers. All nomadic
hunter-gatherers that have ever been de-
scribed, without exception, live by an ideology
of extreme egalitarianism (amongmen). No
nomadichunter-gatherer society toleratesadult
males issuing direct orders to other adult
males. Some groups have a titular leader,
but his role never goes beyond leading by ex-
ample and helping to organize group discus-
sionsaimedatreachingaconsensusongroup
actions (whether to go to war, where to mi-
grate, and the like; Boehm 1999).
Asnotedearlier,Boehm(1993,1997,1999)
argues that nomadic foraging societies are
characterized by a “reverse dominance hier-
archy”: men who would otherwise be sub-
ordinate to an alpha band together to keep
would-be alphas from assuming positions of
dominance. In contrast, Erdal and Whiten
(1994:177) argue that there is an absence, not
a reversal, of hierarchy. According to them,
would-be subordinates simply refuse to obey
would-be leaders. A hunter-gatherer group
does not (in their view) “start with a hierarchy
and [then] reverse it” (Erdal and Whitten
1994:177). Rather, “counterdominant” be-
havior prevents leaders from arising in the
ﬁrst place.
The debate between Boehm and Erdal
andWhiten is not just scholastic. If Erdal and
Whiten are right that forager egalitarianism
is based on a widespread refusal to obey or-
ders, then there would have been essentially
no locus of power among Paleolithic adult
male foragers that could have potentially di-
rectedculturalevolution.Ifnooneeverobeys
authority,no individualor coalitioncanexer-
cise power over anyone else. But if Boehm is
right that egalitarianism is maintained by the
asserted efforts of the rank and ﬁle to keep
downambitious, aggressive, andaccomplished
individuals, Paleolithic bandswouldhavehad
groups—coalitions of the majority—with the
power to potentially impose cultural variants
on those whom they dominated.2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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Boehm in this debate. Perhaps most signiﬁ-
cant is the fact thatnomadichunter-gatherers
deliberately and actively enforce egalitarian-
ism, employing a variety of coercive methods
ranging from gossip to ridicule to ostracism
to expulsion (often a de facto death sentence)
to outright execution. They do not simply re-
fuse to obey commands and rebuff would-be
dominators. They espouse an explicit egali-
tarian ideology (Cashdan 1980) and take ac-
tivemeasures toheadoff possiblepowergrabs
by individuals. As Boehm (1999) argues, our
primate heritage makes us readily suscepti-
ble to developing orthodox hierarchies (i.e.,
with alpha-types dominating everyone else).
Toprevent orthodoxhierarchies fromemerg-
ing requires the group to continually keep
down those who would take control if given
the opportunity.
What is more, the group actively controls
the behavior of potential alphas, compelling
them to procure meat for others and allow-
ing them to act as informal leaders in hunt-
ing and warfare (so that the group beneﬁts
from their expertise without submitting to
theirdomination;Boehm1997:S104).Again,
this goes beyond refusal to obey orders and
reﬂects bona ﬁde domination and control
of potential alphas.
Everyone, not only potentially dominant
individuals, is subject to group rules. People
who are not suspected of political ambitions
but who horde food or engage in deception
canbetargetedbysomeof thesamesanctions
as those who try to gain individual power.
Boehm (1999) quotes Service’s (1975:48–
49) observation that in foraging societies
social life is intensely regulated by “codes,
rules, expectations, habits, and customs that
are related to etiquette, ethic, and role. And
because these are not [normally] explicit,
nor revealed by frequent breaches, the soci-
ety might give the impression of freedom
and lack of conﬂict” (Boehm 1999:84). But
the threat of collectively imposed sanctions
of varying degrees of severity hangs over ev-
eryone’s heads.
The foregoing suggests that, in the sort
of hunter-gatherer bands that existed since
at least the early Middle Paleolithic and to
which our social psychology is presumed toThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termbe adapted, there did exist a locus of power
that was theoretically capable of driving cul-
tural evolution in the way DFL suggested
(i.e., by ﬁat issued by a consensus of groups).
Whether this threatens cultural evolutionary
modeling turns on the answer to an empiri-
cal question: Did hunter-gatherer coalitions
of the majority, as a matter of fact, exercise
the power described above to promote their
favored cultural variants, or did they use it
only to suppress power grabs by would-be
alphas? It will be argued that the empirical
evidence supplied by Boehm (1999, 2012)
strongly suggests that hunter-gatherers did use
their collective power to impose cultural var-
iants that they thoughtwouldpromotegroup
success and well-being—variants broadly re-
lated to morality (note that a great variety of
behavior can be moralized, from food pref-
erences to factual beliefs). They did not use
power to impose variants related to practices
thatwere not thought to directly concern the
group, like individuals’ speciﬁc spear-making
techniques. Consequently, cultural evolution-
ary models can be applied more or less un-
problematically to the nonmoral domain of
culture. It is cultural evolutionary model-
ing of the transmission of group-concerning
moral practices such as reciprocity and pun-
ishment (e.g., Henrich and Boyd 2001) that
may be problematic.The Reverse Dominance Hierarchy
and Deliberate Guidance of
Cultural Evolution
ThissectionbrieﬂyoutlinesBoehm’s(1999,
2012) account of how subordinate humans
circa 250,000 bp overthrew their alphas and,
around the same time, used their newly ac-
quired collective power to impose a deliber-
ately engineered moral code. In the light of
Boehm’s theory, the following section will
critically analyze somewell-knownmodeling
work on the coevolution of prosocial norms
and norm psychology.
From our primate ancestors we inherited
three key dispositions: an enjoyment of domi-
nating, a capacity for submission, and adislike
of being dominated. Among chimpanzees,
these same dispositions lead to the develop-
ment of a dominance hierarchy. Subor-2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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opportunity to challenge higher-ups and as-
cend the hierarchy, if possible. Subordinate
chimpanzees (P. troglodytes) often formcoali-
tions tochallenge thepowerofalphas(Boehm
2012:95–96) but, because of limits on their
coordination abilities and the physical su-
premacy of the dominant individuals, they
never succeed in doing away with the prac-
tice of alpha rule itself.
Chimps, bonobos, and gorillas have the
ability to make generalizations about what
sort of positive or negative behavior will elicit
the wrath of their superior, and purposefully
comply with the superior’s demands (Boehm
2012:106; the behavior demanded by domi-
nant apes mostly concerns feeding priority
and mating; Boehm 2012:107–108). This was
an important preadaptation for our ancestors
to develop the ability to appreciate group-
imposed rules. Taking advantage of our abil-
ity to understand and adopt regular patterns
of behavior, coalitions of the majority in hu-
man groups instituted rules to enforce egal-
itarianism and promote the good of the
collective. For hunter-gatherers, the coalition
of the majority is the object of fear, rather
than, as for chimps or gorillas, powerful dom-
inant individuals. Boehm expounds: “People
like Bushmen or Pygmies gossip incessantly
and are highly judgmental, and group opin-
ion is something to be feared because moral
outragecanleadtoostracism,expulsionfrom
the group, or even execution. This is true of
all hunter-gatherers” (Boehm 2012:107).
Darwin speculated that, when language
developed, “the wishes of the members of
the same community could be distinctly ex-
pressed,thecommonopinionhoweachmem-
ber ought to act for the public good, would
naturally become to a large extent the guide
to action” (Darwin 1871:72). The “power” of
public opinion derived, he said, not from co-
ercion but from our natural love of approba-
tion and “horror of scorn and infamy,”which
itself is rooted in our “[i]nstinctive sympathy”
inherited from our distant ancestors (Dar-
win 1871:86; see Lewens 2007:162–167 for an
overview of Darwin’s account; Darwin 1871
does not explain precisely how “[i]instinctual
sympathy” gives rise to a desire for moral ap-
proval). Although Darwin was right about theThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termnewpossibilities that language created for so-
cial organization, theethnographic evidence
discussed below suggests that hunter-gath-
erers employ coercion to enforce behavior
approved by public opinion. There is good
reason to think that coercive methods were
employed by ancient humans as well. We do
value the moral approval our fellows, and
this is also an important source ofmotivation
to conform to group rules (Mameli 2013:
911). But our desire for moral approval is
most likely an evolved response to the wide-
spreadsocialpracticeofcollectivelypunishing
normviolators, and isnot simply anoutgrowth
of “sympathy.”
Language allows members of coalitions in
a hunter-gatherer band to collectively agree
on what Boehm terms a “blueprint” upon
which to model their society. Echoing Dar-
win, he says that because “humans are able
to communicate in great detail, . . . groups
can develop precise notions about the kind
of society in which they wish to live” (Boehm
1999:193). Whether, as amatter of historical
fact, humans began collectively suppressing
alphas and then started enforcingothermoral
behavior or vice versa (see Boehm 1999:
194), ultimately hunter-gatherers came to
implement blueprints of egalitarian, moral
societies. Boehm (2012:Table 1) reports the
number of cases recorded by ethnologists
where capital punishment was meted out for
various offenses in 50mobile foraging bands.
There are records of capital punishment in
24 of the 50 bands, for a total of 45 instances.
Boehm notes that this is likely a signiﬁcant
underestimate of the prevalence of capital
punishment, because foragers have learned
to conceal such practices from outside au-
thorities (the count here also does not in-
clude expulsion, which, as noted, is often a
de factodeath sentence).Themost common
crimes eliciting a lethal response were vari-
ous forms of intimidating the group with
aggression, violence, or “malicious sorcery.”
But people were also executed for such mo-
ral violationsas theft, failing tosharemeat, in-
cest, adultery, and failing to respect taboos.
To reiterate, execution is just the most ex-
treme formofpunishment.Thevastmajority
of norm violators in hunter-gatherer bands
reform in response to less serious sanctions2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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power of the group tomake society conform
to a desired blueprint.
Humans were hunting with wooden weap-
ons at least 400,000 bp, and were taking down
big game as a regular source of food 250,000
bp (Boehm 2012:146). Boehm speculates that
the key impetus for reversing the dominance
hierarchy came when meat from large ani-
mals became a crucial part of our diet. Hunt-
ing bands can only be effective if all hunters
are reasonably well nourished andmotivated,
and this requires that the meat be shared
rather than hoarded by an alpha and his
coalition partners (Boehm 2012:151–152) or
taken by “greedy thieves and cheaters” (Bo-
ehm 2012:155).
When coalitions of the majority started to
collectively enforce group rules, this created
a strong selection pressure for the develop-
ment of a conscience, and concomitant emo-
tions such as shame and moral pride. To
have a conscience is to “personally [identify]
with community values, which means internal-
izing your group’s rules” so that you are emo-
tionally invested in following them (Boehm
2012:113). Thehuman capacity for language
allows for an extreme degree of effective sur-
veillance. Nomatter whowitnesses a rule vio-
lation,wordcanspreadthroughout thewhole
group. People who “failed to control their
predatory tendencies” (Boehm 2012:67)—
who bullied or cheated or otherwise violated
group norms—would have been at a great
disadvantage. Those who were able to inter-
nalize norms as goals in themselves would
have avoided trouble much better than those
who, like chimps, observed the rules only
when they thought an authority was watch-
ing (Mameli 2013). Given the prospect of
group punishment, developing a good repu-
tation became an important way to increase
individual ﬁtness.
Consider an illustrative example of group
enforcement of norms, reported by Turnbull
(1961:94–108) and cited by Boehm (2012:
37–43). The Mbuti have a hunting practice
where the men set up long nets in the shape
of a semicircle while the women and chil-
dren make noise to drive animals (small- and
medium-sized game) toward them. Accord-This content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terming to their rules, a man can kill any animal
that falls into his own net and take the meat
for his own family. Although there may be
chance variation in how well a man fares on
a given hunting expedition relative to other
men, on average this is a fair way of distribut-
ing the spoils.
In the course of one such hunt, a man
named Cephu felt he was getting short-
changed, so he surreptitiously moved his net
ahead of the others. The strategy worked as
far as increasing his catch but, unfortunately
for him, he was spotted by another hunter.
Word quickly spread of his misdeed. Most of
the other families arrived back at the camp
before him, and a man named Kenge an-
nounced: “Cephu is an impotent old fool. No,
he isn’t, he is an impotent old animal—we
have treatedhim like aman for longenough,
now we should treat him like an animal. Ani-
mal!” (Boehm2012:38–39). This triggered an
outpouring of gossip and condemnation of
Cephu as, in Boehm’s words, “a group con-
sensus materialized” (Boehm 2012:39).
Cephu soon returned, and Kenge shouted
at him that he was an animal. Everyone else
was silent and for a short while just ignored
him. Then, after the whole crowd confronted
Cephu with vague accusations that he was
selﬁsh, someone ﬁnally made a direct accu-
sation against him that he had stolen meat.
One man said that “he hoped Cephu would
fall on his spear and kill himself like the an-
imal he was. Who but an animal would steal
meat from others? There were cries of rage
from everyone, and Cephu burst into tears”
(Turnbull 1961; quoted in Boehm 2012:39–
40).
AtﬁrstCephuargued thathehadmadean
honest mistake. When no one accepted this
excuse, he claimed that he deserved to place
his net in a better position, considering that
he was “an important man, a chief, in fact,
of his own band” (referring to his extended
family;Boehm2012:40).Someoneresponded
that the Mbuti do not have chiefs. If Cephu
was a chief of his own band, “let him go with
it and hunt elsewhere and be a chief else-
where”(Boehm2012:40)—asuggestionthat,
were it followed, would have meant starva-
tion in the forest for Cephu and his family.2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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began to apologize profusely. He agreed to
turn over all of his meat from the day’s catch
to his accusers, and the other bandmembers
then took everything from him and his wife.
Despite all the drama, a few hours later he
participatedwith everyone else in the evening
singing and all was set right again—and pre-
sumably he never repeated his misdeed.
Notice how this real-life example of en-
forcing a cooperative norm is fundamentally
different from what was possible in the ex-
perimental setup of Gürerk et al. (2006; dis-
cussed in the introduction to this paper). All
of the members of the group explicitly coor-
dinated in advance, agreeing on what they
foresaw would be a set of practices that would
lead thegroup tocollectively acquire asmuch
meat as possible and to distribute it fairly.
Membersof the society didnothavea realistic
option to opt out of the system—they could
not choose to participate in a “sanction free
institution.”Thedecision to adopt a coopera-
tive institution andpunish defectors/deviants
was made collectively. In Cephu’s case, we
see that punishment was preceded by collec-
tive coordination. Kenge led the group by
asserting that they should change the way
they treat him: for his misdeed they should
treat him as an animal. Before Cephu ar-
rived, all of the members of the group (be-
sides his immediate family members) had
shared their senseof outragewith eachother,
and established that they were on the same
page.WheneveryoneconfrontedCephu,they
were not doing so as individuals expressing
their personal anger, but as members of a
group that had already come to a collective
understanding.
The collective rebuke and punishment of
Cephu illustrates how our moral sense plays
an important role in undermining the radi-
cal individualistic approach of cultural evo-
lutionary models. Chimp society is despotic
and without morality. In humans, collectively
imposed and accepted moral rules allow co-
ordinated group action among all those who
accept the rules. Hunter-gatherers use mo-
rality to enforce egalitarianism, whereas sed-
entary, resource-hording people use morality to
enforce despotism.Whethermorality is usedThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termto promote egalitarianism or despotism, it
binds people into a collective decision-making
body that cannot be legitimately atomized, as
in cultural evolutionary models.Cultural Evolutionary Models of the
Development of Prosocial Norms
In cultural evolutionary models, cultural
variants are distributed in a population, and
individuals with content and context learn-
ing biases choosewhom to imitate.Modeling
work suggests that, in populations composed
of social learners interacting with each other,
stable behavioral patterns will emerge as a
“by-product” of our learning biases (Chudek
et al. 2013:442). These behavioral equilibria
are more likely to be group detrimental than
beneﬁcial (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Hen-
rich andBoyd2001:86; Chudek andHenrich
2011:222). But, according to other models,
cultural group selection favors the spread of
those equilibria that happen to be beneﬁcial
(e.g., Boyd and Richerson 2002). Then, in a
process of gene-culture coevolution, we be-
come genetically disposed to be receptive to
prosocial behavioral patterns, or “norms” (Hen-
rich and Boyd 2001; Chudek and Henrich
2011; Chudek et al. 2013).
The aforementioned models assume that
there is no organized enforcement of norms—
such as the collective enforcement described
in the previous section. Boyd and Richerson
say that “[f]or most of human history, states
were weak or non-existent, and norms”—
such as “rules against murder”—“were not
enforced by external sanctions” (Boyd and
Richerson 2002:287). Each individual makes
a decision whether or not to imitate the be-
havioral patterns represented in the group.
Among these behavioral patterns are ten-
dencies topunish thosewhofail toexhibit cer-
tain other behaviors. Punishing norm violators
is just another cultural variant that can spread
among individuals. A norm (whether it is ben-
eﬁcial or detrimental to the group) can be sta-
bilized (in part) by punishment. Punishment
is presumed to involve a cost, but it can be re-
inforced by the punishment of nonpunishers.
Punishment of nonpunishers does not have2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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punish nonpunishers) because a combina-
tion of conformism and fear of punishment
will drive cooperation at the ﬁrst level to
near ﬁxation, which in turn lowers the cost
of ﬁrst-order punishment (Boyd andRicher-
son 1992).
As noted, Boyd and Richerson’s models
are based on the assumption that during the
period of gene-culture coevolution in which
norms ﬁrst evolved and we became adapted
to live in a norm-governed environment,
“norms were not enforced by external sanc-
tions” (Boyd and Richerson 2002:287). The
ethnographic evidence discussed in connec-
tion with Boehm’s theory suggests that this is
false. Although there were no “states” or gov-
ernments in the modern sense, there was a
decision-making body—a coalition of thema-
jority—that exercised coercive power, which
amounts to what is effectively the same thing.
The cultural variants to refrain frommurder,
to share meat, and so on were collectively
adopted and formally enforced, not just pun-
ished by isolated individuals who possessed
a variant to punish those who did not exhibit
the relevant behaviors (or to punish in re-
sponse to signals that others will join in their
punishment, as in Boyd et al.’s 2010 model,
discussed earlier).
Chudek et al. (2013) list threepossibleways
that different behavioral equilibria could be
selected. The ﬁrst is that “rational, forward-
looking individuals”perceive theultimate ben-
eﬁts of being in a cooperative equilibrium,
“assume others are similarly sensible, and
choose the prosocial state” (Chudek et al.
2013:439). They give three reasons why they
think this was not a signiﬁcant factor in real
life. First, Chudek et al. say, people are not
actually good at making the calculations re-
quired to determine what practices would
be beneﬁcial. Second, “group decisions are
oftenheavily inﬂuencedby leaders and coali-
tions whose interests diverge from the over-
all group” (Chudek et al. 2013:439). Third,
we see many examples of patently nonproso-
cial institutions in societies throughout the
world. Chudek et al. seem to recognize the
possibility of “group decisions” (in the sec-
ond reason), but they do not explore the im-
plications of this phenomenon for culturalThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termevolutionary theory. Insofar as group deci-
sions do play a role in cultural evolution,
these authors think that they tend to reﬂect
the narrow self-interest of powerful political
factions. They do not consider the possibil-
ity that group decisions can be made by a
coalition of the majority that is more or less
interested in the success of the group as a
whole—but if Boehm was right then this is
in fact abigpartofhowgroups in theancestral
environment selectedamong different possi-
ble behavioral equilibria to collectively en-
force (cf. Singh et al. 2017:470–471).
The second possible way Chudek et al.
(2013) mention to select among behavioral
equilibria is “stochasticity.” By chance, groups
move from one equilibrium to another, and
groups are likely to spendmore time in equi-
libria with larger basins of attraction.
The third way is cultural group selection,
whichactsonthevariationprovided(inpart)
by stochasticity. Cultural evolutionists iden-
tify cultural group selection as by far themost
important factor in the spread of group-
beneﬁcialnorms.Groups randomly adopted
more or less group-beneﬁcial or detrimental
norms, and those with beneﬁcial norms sur-
vived, enjoyed more immigration, and their
individuals were preferentially copied by in-
dividuals in other groups.
Boyd and Richerson (2002) provide a
model showing that, in a population consist-
ing of small groups with behavioral norms
at different equilibria, group-beneﬁcial norms
can spread if people tend to copy more suc-
cessful individuals in either their own or in
neighboring groups. Individuals in groups
with more group-beneﬁcial norms will tend
to be more successful and, therefore, their
norms will be copied by themembers of other
groups. But this model fails to account for
the empirical fact that moral norms are for-
mally enforced (by collective action) within
foraging bands. Individuals from one band
cannot copy the moral norms of individuals
from another (imagine if Cephu responded
to the accusations against him by saying that
he subscribed to the different meat-sharing
practices of a neighboring people). However,
a group can collectively decide to copy another,
more successful group, and begin enforcing
a new suite of norms.2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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transmission” (Henrich 2016:168) as a mat-
ter of “individuals” in one group copying “in-
dividuals” in more successful groups. But
he also describes some striking cases where
the leadership of one group decides to adopt
the practices of another group. In the case
of the Irakia Awa of New Guinea, “senior
men” (Henrich 2016:173; emphasis added)
decided to copy the pig-rearing practices of
theirmore economically successful neighbors,
the Fore. The process of transmission did not
involve individuals copying individuals. In
Henrich’s words: “[T]his transmission be-
tween groups occurred rapidly because the
Irakia already had a political institution in
the village, which involved a council of the
senior members of each clan, who were em-
powered by tradition (social norms) tomake
community-level decisions” (Henrich 2016:
174).
Power played a complicated role in the
adoptionof new communal practices among
the Irakians. A few years after they copied the
Fore, some young men did not want to con-
tinue raising pigs anymore. When they com-
municated their preference to the village
elders, the elders “would not even discuss it
[and] . . . disparaged the idea and criticized
the younger people for being lazy and un-
willing to lead proper lives. . . . The young
men . . . admitted that it would be impossible
tomake such a change with the elders ﬁrmly
against it” (D. J. Boyd 2001:270). However,
another group of young adults converted to
Seventh-Day Adventism—a religion that pro-
hibits theconsumptionofpork.Theyoutright
refused to raise pigs, and no serious sanctions
were imposedon them.Apparently thepower
(that probably took the form of authority) of
the village elders was substantial but not ab-
solute.
Although the Irakians were not foragers,
this story illustrates how the assumptions of
cultural evolutionary models (that transmis-
sion is from individual to individual and that
variants are not imposed on groups of peo-
ple all at once by means of power) do not
apply to many real-life scenarios that have
been studied by cultural evolutionists. Hen-
rich’s verbal description of how the Irakians
adopted the Fore’s practices refers to forcesThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termthat cultural evolutionarymodels do not ac-
commodate.Gene-Culture Coevolution: The
Development of “Norm Psychology”
As discussed, cultural evolutionary theo-
rists argue that the learning biases that lead
us to acquire adaptive cultural information
tend to lead, when many individuals inter-
act with each other, to the development of
norms—“stable group-wide patterns of be-
havior” (Chudek et al. 2013:442). Cultural
evolutionary models of the development of
transmitted behavioral patterns show that a
variety of norms can be stable (Chudek et al.
2013:438–439). Some equilibria are group
beneﬁcial, such as those involving widespread
cooperation and punishment of defection.
Most equilibria are group detrimental, such
as those involving widespread noncoopera-
tion, or widespread, enforced performance
of costly rituals (Chudek and Henrich 2011:
222 give several examples, including dis-
ease-spreading endocannibalism). Although
group-detrimental norms aremore likely than
beneﬁcial norms to develop out of the in-
teraction among individuals within a group
(according to the modelers), cultural group
selection will nevertheless tend to favor the
proliferation of the latter.
Groups that happen to have cooperative
norms tend to outsurvive other groups, re-
ceive more immigrants, and (as discussed
above) their individuals tend to be selected
as models to imitate by individuals in other
groups. On Chudek et al.’s (2013) account,
because norms inevitably arise as a “by-prod-
uct” of cultural learning, natural selection
would have favored innate dispositions for
handling norms—a “normpsychology.”They
suggest that our innate norm psychology pre-
pares us to recognize, and motivates us to ob-
serve, the social norms in our environment.
Since cultural group selection caused coop-
erativenorms(includingnormstopunishde-
fectors and punish nonpunishers) to prevail
in the ancestral environment, our norm psy-
chology should make us especially disposed
to acquire prosocial norms and punish vio-
lators (see also Henrich and Boyd 2001:87).
Indeed, in accordance with Chudek et al.’s2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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dren automatically infer behavioral rules by
observing people (particularly adults), and
that they internalize rule adherence as a per-
sonal goal and even enforce observance in
other children (Chudek and Henrich 2011;
Chudek et al. 2013).
The theories of both Boehm and Chudek
et al. predict the existence of a “norm psy-
chology.” Both claim that Paleolithic hunter-
gatherers lived in norm-governed societies
and that individual success was tied to the
ability to recognize and follow local norms,
which tended to be prosocial. Laboratory ex-
periments revealing our disposition to infer
and follow norms will not adjudicate between
the theories.
The theories, although making virtually
the samepredictions about how recent hom-
inin evolution shaped our psychology, give
different explanatory accounts of how pro-
social norms initially spread, and they paint
radically different pictures of the human ca-
pacity to deliberately guide our own evolution
(both cultural and genetic). The empirical
evidence reviewed in this paper seems to fa-
vor Boehm. Among nomadic hunter-gather-
ers around the world—all that have been
studied by anthropologists—powerful coali-
tions enforce prosocial norms with a great
deal of explicit awareness of the social bene-
ﬁts that observance of these norms will pro-
duce. These coalitions enforce the norms
because individuals have an explicit blue-
print in their minds for what kind of society
they want to live in, and norm enforcement
is a deliberate strategy for bringing that soci-
ety about. In many cases humans are blind to
the consequences of their socially transmitted
practices—the evidence for that is undeni-
able (Henrich 2016). But our hunter-gatherer
ancestors were not blind to the consequences
of all of their practices. When coalitions of
the majority seized power from alphas, they
gained the ability to impose practices that
had consequences that they favored.an alternative explanation for the
development of prosocial behavior:
the “mutualistic theory” of morality
Baumard et al. (2013) defend an alterna-
tive explanation for the evolution of moralThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termjudgment and prosocial behavior. They sug-
gest that, in the ancestral environment, peo-
ple could beneﬁt by cooperating with each
other in a variety of ways: they could hunt to-
gether, share foodwith theexpectationof fu-
ture reciprocation, and so on. Each person
would bring a certain amount of resources,
effort, and talent to cooperative ventures.
This led people to compete to be chosen as
partners for cooperation. IfAwill get a lower
return by cooperating with B than A would
get on average from cooperating with some-
one else, A will be better off not choosing B
as a partner, and B will lose out. Our ances-
tors faced the adaptive challenge of seeking
out good exchange partners while making
themselves attractive exchange partners to
others. Baumard et al. argue that, as a conse-
quence, we evolved a moral disposition to
value “fairness”—the notion that people are
entitled to share in the product of coopera-
tion in proportion to their contribution to
creating that product. In hunter-gatherer
tribes the moral order was not sustained by
collective agreement about rules and collec-
tively administered punishment, but by indi-
viduals exercising “partner choice.”
Baumard et al.’s (2013) theory seems to
explain a range of ﬁndings in experimental
games. For example, in dictator games, where
one person (the dictator) decides how to di-
vide a pot ofmoney with an anonymous part-
ner, dictators tend to keep most of the pot
for themselves. But suppose the dictator is
asked to distribute money that was earned by
the anonymous partner by performing well
in a quiz contest or on an exam. In that case,
dictators tend to become very generous, and
give their partners more or less what they
earned (Rufﬂe 1998; Oxoby and Spraggon
2008).We seemto intuitively feel that people
are entitled to the product of their efforts
and, according to Baumard et al. (2013), we
object to inequality only when it is the conse-
quence of unfairness.
The theories of Baumard et al. and Boehm
can, to some extent, be reconciled. It could
be that groups began collectively enforcing
moral codes around 250,000 bp (as Boehm
argues), but voluntary mutualistic coopera-
tion contributed to the evolution of our
moral sense (in the way described by Baumard
et al.) before that time. Even if early human2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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lied group members and sometimes appro-
priated resources for themselves by force, not
all interactions had to be based on bullying:
group members could still have cooperated
with each other in some contexts, and com-
peted to be chosen as cooperation partners.
Furthermore, evenafterhunter-gatherers es-
tablished a reverse dominance hierarchy and
egalitarian political norms, people were still
allowed to obtain unequal rewards due to
greater ability in some contexts. Although the
rules among nomadic foragers for sharing
meat from big game generally demand a
more or less equal distribution, the rules for
sharing other kinds of food are often much
looser, and people who contribute more to
obtaining such food may have a degree of
freedomtodistribute it as theywish (seeGur-
ven 2004). Even if, since 250,000 bp, hunter-
gatherer bands were politically egalitarian
(amongmales)andbiggamehunting/distri-
bution was a largely socialist enterprise, peo-
ple still formed cooperative relationships with
each other on a smaller scale, and it would
have been advantageous for them to follow
norms of fairness even if these norms were
not always enforced by the collective effort
of the group.
Although some of our behavior andmoral
intuitions can be explained by Baumard
et al.’s (2013) account, we cannot discount
the evidence that antisocial behavior is (and
presumably was) often collectively punished
in egalitarian bands, and that our moral psy-
chology is to some extent tailored to living in
such egalitarian bands. As noted, Baumard
et al. suggest that antisocial hunter-gatherers
are, in general, not formally “punished,” but
rather they suffer when other members of
their group refuse to cooperate with them.
But the anthropological evidence reviewed
above suggests that hunter-gatherers do not
merely withdraw cooperation from antiso-
cial individuals. Groups collectively mete out
positive punishments—the death penalty is
widely administered for a range of offenses.
It is true that, as Baumard et al. say, “[p]un-
ishment . . . is uncommon in societies of for-
agers” (Baumard et al. 2013:66). But this can
be explained by the fact that the threat of
punishment preemptively stopsmost serious
offenses (cf. Service 1975:48–49). The deathThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termpenalty rarely needs to be administered be-
cause it is preceded bymany escalating warn-
ings of what is to come should offenders fail
to reform.
The hypothesis that ourmoral sense is cal-
ibrated for living under conditions of some-
what enforced egalitarianism also explains
someresults fromexperimental games,which
Baumard et al. (2013) cannot so easily ex-
plain. They discuss the following experiment
conducted by Dawes et al. (2007). Subjects
were divided into groups containing four
anonymous members for a one-shot interac-
tion.Eachsubjectwasgivenarandomamount
of money by a computer, and was informed
how much money had been granted to the
other three members. The players then had
the chance to give “positive” or “negative” to-
kens to each other. Giving a positive or a neg-
ative token cost the giver one monetary unit,
and increased or decreased (respectively) the
recipient’s payoff by three monetary units.
Groups were broken apart and formed with
new anonymous members to play again for
a total of ﬁve rounds.
The results of Dawes et al.’s study suggest
that people are willing to pay a penalty to
equalize outcomes. In the course of ﬁve
rounds, 68% of subjects “reduced another
player’s income at least once, 28%did soﬁve
times or more, and 6% did so ten times or
more. . . . 74% . . . increased another player’s
income at least once” (Dawes et al. 2007:
794). Those who received a very high initial
endowment tended to receive many nega-
tive tokens, while those who received a very
low initial endowment tended to receive
many positive ones. Subjects’ token-distrib-
uting behavior cannot be seen as a rational
strategy because, again, the interactions were
one shot. It cannot be interpreted as retali-
ation or punishment, since subjects knew
that all of the payoffs had been determined
randomly by a computer. Rather, subjects
seemed to be bothered by inequality per
se. Baumard et al. offer the following ex-
planation: “Overall, the distribution of [to-
kens] . . . displays the logic of fairness: The
moreaparticipantreceivedmoney, themore
others would ‘tax’ her. Conversely, the less
she received, the more she would get ‘com-
pensated’” (Baumard et al. 2013:75). How-
ever, the way subjects reacted to inequality2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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cooperation. Paying a personal cost in order
to reduce the payoff of luckier individuals
simply reduces the expected payoff from en-
gaging in cooperation. Unlike a “tax,” which
redistributes payoffs and thereby beneﬁts the
recipient, the negative tokens administered
by 68% of subjects reduced both their own
and the recipients’ payoffs without beneﬁting
anyone. Thus, the disposition that motivates
negative-token giving does not make us at-
tractive partners in cooperation. But the be-
havior is easily explained if we assume that
we are adapted to living in hunter-gatherer
bands where a certain degree of egalitarian-
ism was enforced, and people were prohib-
ited from accumulating signiﬁcantly more
resources than their fellows.Discussion
Mainstream cultural evolutionary theory in
theBoyd andRicherson tradition assumes that
cultural variants spread as a consequence of
individuals’ content and context learning bi-
ases, Darwinian selection, and random forces
in a way that is amenable to mathematical
modeling. Durham(1991), Fracchia andLe-
wontin (2005), and Lewontin (2005) raise
the challenge that often cultural variants are
spread through the exercise of power, imply-
ing that the target of explanation for cultural
evolution should be the behavior of power-
ful individuals and groups. This paper argued
that Durham and Fracchia and Lewontin’s
critiquemay be valid as far as the evolution of
morality and prosociality goes (at least since
250,000 bp), but less so for the spread of non-
moral cultural variants (perhaps until the
adventof sedentarism, foodstorage,andagri-
culture).
Cultural evolutionists emphasize that their
models are not intended to capture every-
thing that happens in real life (Richerson
and Boyd 1987; McElreath and Boyd 2007:
4–6). Like all models, they are meant to be
simpliﬁcations that isolate some of the main
forces at play. But if something like Boehm’s
(1999, 2012) account of the evolution ofmo-
rality is correct, cultural evolutionarymodels
of the evolution of morality and the coevolu-
tion of norms and normpsychology are distor-
tions, not simpliﬁcations. A legitimate modelThis content downloaded from 080.04
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Termmay isolate one or a few forces among the
multitude that exist in the real world. It can-
not postulate forces that are not operative at
all, or ignore those that have a decisive inﬂu-
ence on the phenomena under investigation.
In light of the anthropological evidence
reviewed in this paper, we can see how Boyd
et al.’s (2010) model of the evolution of “co-
ordinated punishment” distorts history. Ac-
cording to Boyd et al., there was a genetic
mutation(s) associated with the behavior to
punish cheaters if τ other people in my group
(honestly) signal that they are prepared to punish
cheaters (again, this mutation can survive bet-
ter than the mutation associated with always
punish cheaters, since always punishers are
disadvantaged when they are a small minor-
ity). In a population containing some condi-
tional punishers, by chance a few groups will
have the threshold number (i.e., τ + 1), and
they will prosper and replace other groups,
thereby increasing the number of conditional
punishers.
The story that Boehm (1999, 2012) tells is
very different. He says that coalitions within
human groups formed and explicitly agreed
to enforce certain kinds of prosocial behav-
ior throughpunishment.Thepeopleinvolved
did not have any preexisting disposition to
punish. The practice of punishing people to
enforce prosocial norms arose all at once.
In contrast, on Boyd et al.’s (2010) account
the genetically based disposition to punish
arose ﬁrst, then people developed a social
norm to punish. On Boehm’s (1999, 2012)
account, because groups started practicing
collective punishment, this created selection
pressures for people with a genetic disposi-
tion to punish norm transgressors.
Tobe clear, the point of this paper isnot to
say that there are real-life complexities that
cultural evolutionary models fail to capture.
The point is that some of the fundamental
forces that drive cultural evolution, and drove
the coevolution of norms and norm psychol-
ogy, cannot be accommodated by the sorts
of models used in cultural evolutionary the-
ory. Most of the mathematical models em-
ployed in cultural evolutionary theory are
best adapted to cases where forces act in regu-
lar, iterative ways. Perhaps evolution in some
domains of culture does work like that—cul-
tural evolutionarymodeling in these domains2.128.018 on November 12, 2018 06:45:58 AM
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Lewontin’s (2005) challenge. In other do-
mains—including the moral—a more tradi-
tional historical/anthropological/sociological
approach may be more fruitful (and legiti-
mate).This content downloaded from 080.04
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